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Abstract 
Congress tasked the Section 809 Panel with streamlining the acquisition process at 
the Department of Defense (DoD; Section 809 Panel, 2018). Streamlining the acquisition 
process should make government more efficient and attract new business partners. The 
notion of large private contractors excessively protesting at the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) is a potential barrier to entry for new businesses. 
This paper will explore congressional attempts to limit protests filed at the GAO 
through reforms in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. The reform 
instituted a three year “losers pay” pilot program that requires contractors with unsuccessful 
protests to reimburse the DoD for costs incurred in processing certain protests. Based on 
my analysis of the data collected and a concurrent study by the RAND Corporation, this 
reform will not achieve the desired result of streamlining the acquisition process.  
Instead, the data and information gathered from the GAO, Federal Business 
Opportunities, and stakeholder interviews suggest that condensing protests into a singular 
review would streamline the acquisition process more effectively. Companies sometimes file 
multiple protests at the GAO regarding a single solicitation to obtain information about why 
they lost the bid. This policy alternative will make the federal government transparent for 
current contractors and potential partners. 
Introduction 
The Section 809 Panel was tasked by Congress in the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 to streamline and improve the defense 
acquisition process. The panel is divided into 10 teams. Team Four addresses “Barriers to 
Entry.” This team evaluates and removes regulatory, cultural, or bureaucratic barriers to 
entry at the Department of Defense (DoD) marketplace (Section 809 Panel, 2018).  
The Section 809 Panel proposes that the current bid-protesting environment may 
prevent new companies from conducting business with the DoD. Subsequently, bid-protest 
reforms became a policy initiative of Team Four “Barriers to Entry.” Administrative costs and 
the loss of time connected to contract protests may outweigh the potential benefits of new 
companies bidding on and securing DoD contracts. This paper will analyze the protesting 
landscape at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding DoD contracts and 
make appropriate recommendations based on the findings of this and other scholarly 
research. 
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Policy Question 
This paper addresses the following policy questions: Considering the passage of 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Bid Protest Reforms in the FY 2018 NDAA, what is 
the potential effect on protests of DoD contract awards? Furthermore, are there other policy 
options that the Section 809 Panel should consider outside of the FY 2018 NDAA 
recommendations? And if so, how would these alternatives alter the protest process to 
make it easier for private contractors to do business with the federal government? 
Background 
In this section, I will address the original intent of contract protests and current trends 
in the contract protest at the GAO, and I will summarize the RAND Corporation findings. 
This section will not cover court systems’ protest history nor current trends because there is 
no uniform procedure in which the courts adjudicate bid protests. 
Original Intent of the Contract Protest 
Bid protesting to the federal government began in the 1920s shortly after the creation 
of the GAO. Losing companies wrote to the agency complaining that government contracts 
had been unjustly awarded to competitors and petitioned the GAO to review and mitigate 
the dispute (Gordon, 2013). The GAO delivered its first decision in 1926 when the agency 
intervened in a trucking contract regarding the Panama Canal. The Autocar Sales and 
Service Company petitioned the GAO to review a contract awarded to Federal Motor Truck 
Company. The contract stipulated certain truck features unique to Federal Motor Truck 
Company vehicles and the Autocar Sale and Service Company sought remedies for the 
unfair favoritism (GAO, 2017). Federal Motor Truck Company kept the contract, yet the 
GAO’s review and decision prevented future contracts from containing specific modifications 
that favored one private company. 
Since the original Panama Canal bid protest presented to the GAO in 1926, several 
laws have attempted to funnel the protest process into a single government agency or 
system. However, these laws always included a sunset clause or were replaced by new 
laws with different methods of bid protest. While the GAO has accepted and reviewed bid 
protests since the 1920s, the current definition of a bid protest was not formalized until the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984. Federal Agencies amended the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 1995 to reflect CICA. FAR Part 33 Section 101 Definitions 
contains the four conditions in which a losing bidder may provide a written objection: 
(1) A solicitation or other request by an agency for offers for a contract for the 
procurement of property or services. 
(2) The cancellation of the solicitation or other request. 
(3) An award or proposed award of the contract. 
(4) A termination or cancellation of an award of the contract, if the written 
objection contains an allegation that the termination or cancellation is 
based in whole or in part on improprieties concerning the award of the 
contract. (“Rules and Regulations,” 1995) 
Protests provide businesses a valuable mechanism that serves two purposes. First, 
protests allow entities doing business with the government to air their grievances about 
government contracting processes and seek relief. Without this mechanism, private entities 
may be less inclined to do business with the federal government. Second, the protest 
mechanisms hold procurement officials and government agencies accountable by 
highlighting and correcting inaccuracies in the bid process (Manuel & Schwartz, 2016). 
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CICA established the GAO as the venue for contractors to address perceived errors 
in the bid process by all federal agencies. Upon a protest receipt to the GAO, the law 
stipulated that activities pertaining to the awarded contract and within the scope of the 
legislation must be suspended until the GAO rules on the case. Federal agencies may 
override the stay if agencies determine urgent and compelling circumstances will not permit 
waiting for the GAO’s decision, or if performance of the contract is in the best interests of the 
United States (Manuel & Schwartz, 2016). Originally, the law established a deadline of 90 
working days for the GAO to issue a ruling on a protest. Newer laws extended the deadline 
to 100 days. Furthermore, the awarding agency (DoD, Energy, etc.) may take up to 60 days 
to administer the GAO’s recommendations (Manuel, 2011).  
Current Trends 
The White House recently confirmed the need for acquisition reform in the 
President’s Management Agenda for 2018. The agenda indicated a problem with acquisition 
managers who are more concerned with compliance than best business practices.  
Major acquisitions (over $50 million) often fail to achieve their goals because 
many federal managers lack the program management and acquisition skills 
required to successfully manage and integrate large and complex 
acquisitions into their projects. These shortcomings are compounded by 
complex acquisition rules that reward compliance over creativity and results. 
(President’s Management Council, 2018)  
This sentiment will be discussed later while analyzing stakeholder interviews from 
government officials and private companies. 
Prior to FY 2018, reports from the Congressional Research Service, the GAO, and 
others described trends in the number of protest cases brought to the GAO by the DoD and 
other government agencies. However, little information existed about the cost of these 
protests. The sheer number of protests in recent years has doubled, specifically for the DoD. 
Protests regarding DoD contracts increased from approximately 600 in FY 2001 to 1,200 in 
FY 2015 (Manuel, 2011). The GAO did not necessarily issue a decision on each DoD bid-
protest. However, each protest carried the possibility of an operations delay which could 
negatively impact the business and the warfighter.  
Some analysts within the government and defense industries suggest that the mere 
threat of a bid protest affects both the bidding business and the awarding agency business 
practices and workflow. Maser and Thompson (2010) assert that “rejected offerors have 
incentives to threaten to protest as a way to obtain a percentage of the award as a 
subcontractor to the winner, or to obtain a settlement payment from the agency to avoid a 
protest.” However, little statistical evidence supports the threat of protesting claim, and it will, 
therefore, receive limited attention in the following research. Some reports suggest that 
“contractors knowingly file frivolous protests with GAO in order to harass their competitors 
and delay awards, or in the hopes of obtaining short-term contracts from the government 
while the GAO is reviewing the protest” (Defense Industry Daily, 2010). 
The U.S. Air Force’s CSAR-X contract awarded to Boeing to supply its H-47 
Helicopter in 2006 illustrates some of the cost and problems associated with excessive 
protests. Two of the losing bidders, Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin, filed protests with the 
GAO over the Boeing award. The GAO sustained the protests and recommended a re-
compete of the CSAR-X program. More protests followed this contract over the next two 
years. Protests challenged the Air Force’s compliance with the GAO’s recommendations 
and for fuel-cost specifications in the Request for Proposal, among others. The Pentagon’s 
Inspector General began an audit into “key performance parameters” in the CSAR-X RFP in 
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March 2008. Due to the Pentagon audit’s adverse findings, Defense Secretary Gates 
decided to cancel the program “for convenience” in April 2009. Commander of the Air Force 
Material Command, General Bruce Carlson estimated that the GAO protest process cost the 
USAF $800 million in the CSAR-X RFP case (Defense Industry Daily, 2010). It is unclear 
how General Carlson calculated his estimate, and this paper challenges his estimate later 
on. 
RAND Corporation Findings 
The RAND Corporation published a study in February 2018 regarding bid-protest 
reform in the federal government titled Assessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of 
Defense Procurements (Arena, 2018). Their research into protests was much broader than 
my narrow GAO focus. Their four research questions were as follows: 
1. When bid protests are filed, what is the nature and value of these 
contracts, and what is their share of total defense procurement contract 
dollars? 
2. What are the outcomes of bid protests? 
3. How do protesters perceive post-award debriefings in which the reasons 
for the contract award are explained? 
4. When a protester is successful, how often is voluntary corrective action 
taken by the DoD contracting agency? (Arena, 2018) 
The report produced three key findings. First, RAND discovered that despite a 
steady increase in bid protests filed by DoD contractors, the overall number of protests 
remains small. Second, RAND found that DoD agencies and the private sector had differing 
views on the bid protest process. Last, RAND noted the different trends between the GAO 
and court-filed protests (Arena, 2018). I intentionally omitted court-filed protests in my 
research. The GAO has nearly a century of policies in place that govern their bid-protest 
process, and their data is relatively accessible to the public. Omitting court filed bid protests 
will not take away from the research question nor the solutions provided. Furthermore, 
courts have multiple appeals systems which companies can file protests within. Retrieving 
data from multiple court systems was too large in scope for this project.  
RAND recommended six courses of action for the federal government. Five of the 
recommendations are most applicable to my research: 
• Enhance the quality of post-award debriefings. Improved debriefings will 
give disappointed bidders a better understanding of the evaluation and 
award process and help them better analyze potential protest grounds 
before filing a protest. 
• Be careful in considering reductions to the timeline for resolving bid 
protests filed with the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) from 
100 to 65 days. Seventy percent of protest cases are resolved within 60 
days, but complex decisions typically take close to the 100-day limit. 
• Be careful in considering restrictions on task-order protests. These 
protests are more likely to be sustained or involve corrective action, so 
they may fill an important role in improving the fairness of DoD 
procurements. 
• Consider implementing an expedited process for adjudicating protests 
involving contracts valued under $0.1 million. The costs to adjudicate 
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these protests under the current system may exceed the value of the 
procurements. (Arena, 2018) 
Analysis of FY 2018 NDAA 
A Washington Post article on October 10, 2017, reported on a new provision of the 
Senate’s version of FY 2018 NDAA that would institute penalties for unsuccessful protests 
on companies with annual revenues over $100 million (Davenport, 2017). The law would 
encompass every DoD bid and subsequent protest filed through the GAO. The DoD is by far 
the largest contracting agency within the federal government which is why the Senate 
included the protest reform targeting the DoD within its version of the FY 2018 NDAA. The 
penalties were intended to dissuade large companies with annual revenues over $100 
million from excessive protesting at the GAO. The theory was that if a large company was 
fined for losing every protest it filed, companies would be more selective when filing future 
protests. The GAO would subsequently spend less time and money reviewing the smaller 
protests.  
The proposed Senate reform may have caught the attention of defense companies 
like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and other 
defense contractors whose annual revenues exceed $100 million. Senate staffers and 
others working on protest reform believed that these companies’ wealth would encourage 
them to protest more frequently in absence of any penalty (Contractor, personal 
communication, March 19, 2018). The relevant wording of Section 821 of the Senate’s 
version of FY 2018 NDAA is presented below:  
(a) Payment Of Costs For Denied Protests.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—A contractor who files a protest described under 
paragraph (2) with the GAO on a contract with DoD shall pay to 
DoD costs incurred for processing a protest at the GAO and the 
DoD. 
(2) COVERED PROTESTS.—A protest described under this 
paragraph is a protest— 
(A) all of the elements of which are denied in an opinion issued by 
the GAO; and 
(B) filed by a party with revenues exceeding $100 mil during the 
previous year. 
(b) Withholding Of Payments Above Incurred Costs Of Incumbent 
Contractors.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Contractors who file a protest on a contract on 
which they are the incumbent contractor shall have all payments 
above incurred costs withheld on any bridge contracts or 
temporary contract extensions awarded to the contractor as a 
result of a delay in award resulting from the filing of such protest. 
(2) DISPOSITION OF WITHHELD PAYMENTS ABOVE INCURRED 
COSTS.— 
(A) RELEASE TO INCUMBENT CONTRACTOR.—All payments 
above incurred costs of a protesting incumbent contractor 
withheld pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be released to the 
protesting incumbent contractor if— 
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(i) the solicitation that is the subject of the protest is 
cancelled and no subsequent request for proposal 
is released or planned for release; or 
(ii) if the Government Accountability Office issues an 
opinion that upholds any of the protest grounds 
filed under the protest. 
(B) RELEASE TO AWARDEE.—Except for the exceptions set 
forth in subparagraph (A), all payments above incurred costs 
of a protesting incumbent contractor withheld pursuant to 
paragraph (1) shall be released to the contractor that was 
awarded the protested contract prior to the protest. 
(C) RELEASE TO DoD IN EVENT OF NO CONTRACT 
AWARD.—Except for the exceptions set forth in subparagraph 
(A), if a protested contract for which payments above incurred 
costs are withheld under paragraph (1) is not awarded to a 
contractor, the withheld payments shall be released to the 
DoD and deposited into an account that can be used by the 
Department to offset costs associated with GAO bid protests. 
(S. 115-125, 2017) 
Section 821 was added by the Senate after the House passed its own NDAA without 
the protest reform language.  
The GAO, Congress, and the DoD repeatedly called for protest reform through 
speeches and reports over the last decade. However, most defense contractors criticized 
the proposed legislative change while acknowledging only some companies would be 
affected.  
Steven Koprince is a managing partner at Koprince Law LLC and primary contributor 
to SmallGovCon, a legal news and notes outlet for small government contractors. He 
identified potential pitfalls with the Senate reform in a July 2017 article. Koprince questioned 
whether a problem of “frivolous” protest existed. He noted that over 99% of contracts are not 
protested and that even though protesters have the burden of proof, overall GAO protests 
are successful roughly 40% of the time (Koprince, 2017). However, Koprince failed to 
separate the DoD from other government agency protests which could illustrate a different 
environment of protesting.  
Koprince also failed to elaborate on what constitutes a “successful” protest at the 
GAO. There are five decisions the GAO can issue for a protest: Granted, Sustained, 
Withdrawn, Dismissed, or Denied. If he considers “successful” protests as those which the 
GAO issued a final ruling in favor of the protestor (Sustained or Granted), then my data will 
show a significantly lower success rate than 40%. His definition of success is further 
muddled by the government’s ability to take “corrective action.” When the government takes 
corrective action to address an error or misstep, many protests which are then “Dismissed” 
or “Withdrawn” could be considered a success. “Denied” protests go through the full protest 
process and their grounds are rejected in the final decision by the GAO (Arena, 2018). 
Koprince wrote the article during the Senate sessions on the NDAA in the summer of 
2017. He identified a serious problem with the legislation; the bill would allow the protesting 
company to recover its profits under two circumstances: if the solicitation in question was 
cancelled, or if the GAO issued an opinion to uphold any of the protest grounds filed under 
the protest. These caveats could have allowed protestors to rescind their protests on the last 
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day or recoup their money if just one small piece of the protest was upheld. While the 
reconciled bill eliminated withholding profits, Koprince’s other reservations about the reform 
still hold true. Even considering the flaws highlighted by Koprince and others, Section 821 of 
the Senate’s FY 2018 NDAA was the first attempt at fixing a perceived problem with bid 
protests in the federal government. 
On November 16, 2017, the NDAA left conference committee with a diluted protest 
reform provision. The final version of the NDAA for FY 2018 submitted to the President for 
signature contained three major differences from Section 821 of the Senate version of the 
bill. First, the resolved bill changed the “loser pays” protest reform from a law affecting all 
companies with revenue exceeding $100 million into a three-year pilot program beginning in 
2019 applicable only to companies with revenues over $250 million. Second, the reconciled 
bill no longer withheld profits from incumbent contractors who protest contract awards. Third, 
the bill eliminated the accelerated GAO decision time frame. The GAO’s 100-day decision 
deadline remained intact (Lasky, 2017). Section 827: Pilot Program on Payment of Costs for 
Denied Government Accountability Office Bid Protests of the final FY 2018 NDAA is 
presented below: 
(a) PILOT PROGRAM REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry 
out a pilot program to determine the effectiveness of requiring contractors 
to reimburse the Department of Defense for costs incurred in processing 
covered protests. 
(b) DURATION.—The pilot program shall— 
(1) begin on the date that is two years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act; and 
(2) end on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the pilot 
program under subsection (a) ends, the Secretary shall provide a report 
to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate assessing the feasibility of making permanent such pilot 
program. 
(d) COVERED PROTEST DEFINED.—In this section, the term “covered 
protest” means a bid protest that was— 
(1) denied in an opinion issued by the Government Accountability 
Office; 
(2) filed by a party with revenues in excess of $250,000,000 (based 
on fiscal year 2017 constant dollars) during the previous year; and 
(3) filed on or after October 1, 2019 and on or before September 30, 
2022. (H.R. 2810, 2017) 
This diluted reform still attempts to address the perceived problem of too many costly 
bid protests from DoD contractors. However, after the FY 2018 NDAA was signed into law, 
the RAND Corporation produced its report that dispelled the notion of excessive protesting. 
RAND found that the share of contracts protested remains very small—less than 0.3%. A 
significant number of these protests concerned smaller-value contracts ($0.1 million or less; 
Arena, 2018). Larger contractors are not prevented from bidding on smaller contracts but if 
RAND found that more protests stem from smaller solicitations, then Section 827 of the FY 
2018 NDAA may have missed the mark. 
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Another problem with the compromise reform in FY 2018 NDAA is how the 
government will determine the cost of protesting to the government. The vague language in 
FY 2018 NDAA does not specify what constitutes reimbursement to “the Department of 
Defense for costs incurred in processing covered protests” (H.R. 2810, 2017). There is no 
payment to companies who won the protests but lose time working on it due to stays from 
the bid-protest review at the GAO. It remains unclear what “costs incurred” to the DoD are 
and how the pilot program plans to calculate this fine. 
In FY 2018 NDAA, the federal government attempted to address the perceived 
problem of excessive protesting by large government contractors. Congress initially tried to 
impose fines and withhold profits from large protestors but the final reform in FY 2018 NDAA 
imposes unclear and highly targeted fines. The three-year pilot program that penalizes large 
companies for unsuccessful protests will undergo further analysis using GAO and Federal 
Business Opportunities (FBO) data later in this paper. 
Data and Methods 
Introduction 
To operationalize my research question, I looked at data provided by the GAO and 
FBO’s Opportunities list. FBO is a free web-based portal which allows vendors to review 
federal procurement opportunities over $25,000 (Department of Commerce, 2012). The 
government website also retains all posted solicitations over the last calendar year in its 
archives. This data provided the average value of protests at time of award decided by the 
GAO, the decisions the GAO ruled regarding the protests, and the number of companies 
protesting DoD contracts. I linked high value at time of award with large companies because 
those businesses have greater resources to bid and perform on high value contracts. 
Trends in bid protest values and companies who file them provided by GAO and FBO data 
will help analyze the potential effects of GAO Bid Protest Reform in FY 2018 NDAA. The 
analysis will also provide useful information to propose new reforms that could help Section 
809 fulfil its duty to streamline the acquisition process. 
Patterns in Bid-Protesting Methodology 
The GAO maintains a database that records every protest brought to the Office in 
recent years. I could not record the thousands of DoD subdivision protests due to time and 
resource constraints. Instead, I first noted all Department of Defense contracts and 
recognized that the subdivision of Defense Logistics Agency contained the largest number 
of protests. I proceeded to select the similar Army Material Command and Navy Supply 
Systems command to complete my three subdivision choices. 
After identifying the three subdivisions, I decided on the timeframe and type of 
protest to research. By restricting the search to Closed Docket DoD protests decided within 
the last calendar year, I could record the success rate of DoD protests. I initially selected FY 
2016 because it would have contained the most updated record of GAO protests within a 
solid timeframe. However, once I began recording data, many of the older protests 
disappeared from the GAO server. To ensure a complete cache of bid protests, I changed 
my parameters to protests decided between January 17, 2017, through January 24, 2018, 
for the Defense Logistics Agency; January 26, 2017, through January 24, 2018, for Army 
Material Command; and February 8, 2017, through January 30, 2018, for Navy Supply 
Systems Command. These slightly different date parameters may have missed a small 
number of decided protests, but that number should not affect the findings. I recorded 472 
closed bid protests from the GAO from the three DoD subdivisions. 
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I then populated 472 closed bid protests from the GAO with the “value at award” of 
each solicitation found in the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) archived database. I 
searched other databases including the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), but the 
site contained less accessible information than FBO. Some incomplete or missing 
solicitation numbers from the GAO prevented me from obtaining the value at award 
information for some protests. However, many more protests on my GAO list displayed 
complete solicitation numbers but were indiscoverable on the FBO website. In total, I found 
value at award information on 159 out of 472 closed docket protests. The 33.7% completion 
rate may be caused by incorrect data entry by the GAO or FBO or more likely, the initial 
solicitation notice was over a year old. Per FBO’s support department, “some of the notices 
could have been archived more than a year ago, (and FBO’s) archive database only looks 
back 365 days. Also, fbo.gov does not communicate directly with the GAO site, (GAO is) 
independent. So, it is possible that some of the notices were not posted on FBO” (Federal 
Business Opportunities, 2018). 
Once the matrix was completed, I analyzed the data to determine if larger contracts 
(which are likely to be bid upon by companies with revenues over $250 million) are in fact 
protested more than smaller contracts (under $250 million). Analyzing the closed-docket 
protests over the last year served to test a perception that the rate of protest varies with 
size. Government officials tend to believe that a major factor in determining a company’s 
protest strategy is the sheer size of the contract. A higher value contract results in more 
profit so larger companies will use their extra assets to protest the valuable contracts 
(Contractor, personal communication, March 19, 2018). Furthermore, the analysis of 
whether there is a higher rate of protest among larger companies will operationalize my 
research question. Answering the rate of protest question by comparing the rates side by 
side will determine whether the proposed policy change targeting only large companies is 
more effective in saving federal money than small companies. 
Results 
GAO and FBO Findings 
I was unable to find the value at time of award for over 66% of the 472 closed docket 
protests between the three subdivisions. Part of the reason for the lack of dollar value 
information may be because companies filed protests during the solicitation process and 
before the contract was awarded. Additionally, the GAO and FBO regularly miscommunicate 
and share inconsistent information with each other according to a GAO official contacted for 
this research.  
Nevertheless, there was still valuable information among the protests with 
incomplete information. The 159 completed closed-docket bid protests provided a valuable 
snapshot of the perceived problem regarding excessive protest filing at the GAO from DoD 
contractors. The average value at time of award for the bid-protest in this research was 
$188,703,404.28. Two DoD subdivisions reflected similar average values at time of award: 
Defense Logistics Agency averaged $23,222,383.76 among their 39 protests and Navy 
Supply Systems Command averaged $31,690,997.52 among their 24 protests. Army 
Material Command was a significant outlier given the average value at the time of award 
was $292,140,760.84 within the data set of 97 protests. Attributing to the inflated Army 
Material Command average values are multiple bid protests over the same high-value DoD 
solicitation. I will discuss the inflated Army Material Command average values in the 
analysis section. 
- 714 - 
As mentioned earlier, the GAO designates five possible outcomes for a protest: 
Dismissed, Withdrawn, Denied, Granted, and Sustained. The GAO generally sustains 
protests where it determines that the contracting agency violated procurement statutes or 
regulations, unless it concludes that the violation did not prejudice the protester (GAO, 
2018). In the fully populated 472 protests, 381 protests did not go through the entire protest 
process. 293 were Dismissed and 88 were Withdrawn. Ninety-one protests were completed: 
85 were Denied, five were Sustained, and one was Granted. This information is represented 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. GAO Decisions on 472 Protests 
In the 159 complete protests dataset, 127 protests did not go through the entire 
protests process. Ninety-nine were Dismissed, and 28 were Withdrawn. Thirty-two protests 
were completed with 31 Denied and only one protest Sustained (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. GAO Decisions on 159 Protests 
The average value of the 127 Withdrawn and Dismissed protests was 
$219,999,788.66. The average value of the 31 Denied protests was $75,506,673.33; and 
the value of the singular Sustained protest was $3,161,460.00.  
My data showed average values at time of award for Army Material Command nearly 
10 times higher than Defense Logistics Agency or Navy Supply Systems Command. There 
were protests with a very high “Maximum Potential Contract” ceiling for Army Material 
Command solicitations. Fifty-four of the 97 closed docket bid protests were valued at over 
$100 million. However, those 54 protests represented only seven different solicitations. One 
$500 million solicitation for electronic computing technology, W52P1J-15-R-0122, generated 
34 separate protests from 23 companies. One company alone submitted four protests for a 
$248 million engineering contract award, W900KK-15-R-0012. Table 1 displays the protests 
regarding high value solicitations. 
Table 1. Protests for High Value Solicitations 
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Multiple protests from one company was another pattern established in my data. The 
GAO processed and closed protests for 263 unique companies within the last calendar year 
for the three DoD subdivisions. Four companies alone accounted for 15.5% of the GAO 
processed protests and one company, Aerosage, accounted for 6.8% of the 472 closed 
docket protests. This trend is reflected in the entire dataset, not just the high value contracts 
displayed previously. 
Stakeholders’ Perspective 
The RAND Corporation report provided robust information regarding stakeholders’ 
views on the protest process. A key takeaway from their stakeholder analysis was that DoD 
personnel generally believe incumbent companies are more likely to protest when they have 
lost in a follow-on competition (Arena, 2018). In addition to the RAND findings, I conducted 
interviews with individuals who questioned the perceived problem of excessive protesting.  
A lawyer for a major defense contractor cited the RAND study and his own work 
when he rejected the idea that companies were engaging in frivolous protesting. 
Furthermore, he claimed the majority of his company’s protests, especially those of larger 
value, were protested not for substantive reasons. Instead, the bids were protested for more 
information. In such cases, protests were often withdrawn or dismissed once the company 
was satisfied with the information regarding their loss of a contract. RAND addressed this in 
their recommendation when they suggested the GAO improve their debriefings to losing 
companies. My interviewer acknowledged that debriefs have improved over the years but 
that there is still no standard method of delivering debriefs to companies and said this needs 
to change.  
In general, the interviewer placed the responsibility of improving the protest process 
on the government. He suggested that the overwhelming majority of protests are due to a 
lack of information from the government or a government mistake. Protesting a bid is, 
therefore, a tool to keep the government accountable for intentional or unintentional harmful 
business practices. Furthermore, he questioned the ability of the federal government to 
accurately audit its own cost of processing a protest. FY 2018 NDAA’s language remains 
vague in this regard, thus, leading to skepticism that the government will enact any penalty.  
His final comments placed doubt on the effectiveness of the “loser pays” provision in 
the FY 2018 NDAA. Speaking candidly, he said the threat of paying the cost of GAO 
processing is essentially a non-factor when his company decided to protest. If his company 
lost a high value contract worth over $250 million, the opportunity cost of not protesting 
would be incredibly high. Discovering the relevant information to become more competitive 
in future bids outweighs any administrative penalties the federal government would impose 
(Contractor, personal communication, March 19, 2018). He also floated the idea of shifting 
all protests to the court system and eliminating the GAO to save the government money but 
acknowledged this will likely never happen. 
After reviewing the results of the bid protest data provided by the GAO and FBO, the 
need for an alternative solution is clear. The following criteria and alternatives section may 
better reform the bid protest process than the solution in FY 2018 NDAA. I will analyze these 
alternatives against the criteria to determine if they satisfy my second research question: 
how the Section 809 Panel can make it easier for private companies to conduct business 
with the DoD.  
Criteria for Policy Evaluation 
Some criteria are required to evaluate potential solutions to GAO filed protests. 
Listed below are three criteria which, if satisfied, will indicate a potentially successful policy 
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option to improve the protest process and fulfill the Section 809 Panel’s goal to make it 
easier for private companies to conduct business with the DoD. They are derived from a 
GAO report on protest reform along with suggestions from former Director of Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Deidre Lee. The purpose of the policies is to  
 decrease the number of contract protests presented to the GAO, 
 increase potential new business partners with the DoD, and 
 save the government money and time (Murphy, 1995). 
Policy Alternatives 
The criteria for successful bid protest reform will be matched against the following 
three policy alternatives. The first policy alternative is a continuation of FY 2018 NDAA 
beyond the three-year pilot program. The next two policy alternatives were developed 
through an interview with a lawyer at a major defense contractor who is affected by the FY 
2018 NDAA reforms. 
1. Make “losers pay” pilot program in FY 2018 NDAA permanent law. 
This alternative would codify the three-year pilot program into permanent 
law extending beyond 2022. 
2. Funnel all DoD protests regarding a singular solicitation into one 
review. Companies currently file one protest for each issue they identify 
with a single solicitation. This alternative would require the GAO to 
consider all points of contention regarding one solicitation in a single 
review and decision process. 
3. Eliminate the GAO’s role in adjudicating bid protests. The GAO 
established a procedure for reviewing bid protests nearly 100 years ago 
and the number of reviewed DoD protests has grown rapidly over the last 
decade. This policy alternative would eliminate the GAO’s role in judging 
bid protests and move it to the court system. 
Analysis 
The three policy alternatives will be graded against each individual criterion to 
determine a final score. This score will demonstrate the likelihood that the policy alternative 
will solve part of the protest problem established in the policy question. 
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Table 2. Criteria Scoring System 
Score Explanation 
0 Fails to satisfy criterion 
1 Partially Satisfies criterion 
2 Fully satisfies criterion 











0 0 1 1 
As shown in my data and RAND’s data, the highest volume of bid protests originates 
with contracts valued under $1,000,000 and companies affected by the pilot program are 
less likely to bid on such contracts. Furthermore, this alternative will not deter large 
companies from protesting bids on high value contracts. My interview subject asserted that 
the consensus of the contracting sector is if a large company decides to file a protest 
regarding a large solicitation, the penalties imposed by the GAO and the DoD are simply the 
cost of business (Contractor, personal communication, March 19, 2018). This policy 
alternative does not affect companies with annual revenues under $250 million and is 
therefore unlikely to decrease the number of protests filed at the GAO.  
Turning the pilot program into permanent law is unlikely to attract new business to 
the DoD because few new companies would be large enough to be affected by the protest 
penalties. Additionally, because the number of protests is unlikely to decrease, new 
companies will not view the policy alternative as a new opportunity for business.  
Turning the pilot program into permanent law will minimally impact the GAO or DoD 
budget or time spent on protests. The number of protests is likely to remain the same and 
the fines imposed on contractors is unclear. The DoD may recuperate some money from the 
fines imposed on contractors but only when the GAO fully denies the protest. The data 
shows this is a small portion of the protests and therefore will not save the government 
much time or money. 
The RAND Corporation, my interview subject, and other stakeholders all highly doubt 
that the “losers pay” provision of the FY 2018 NDAA will generate dramatic changes to the 
federal procurement and acquisition system. Section 809 Panel is charged with making 
recommendations that will shape the DoD’s acquisition system into one that is bold, simple, 
and effective (Section 809 Panel, 2018). Establishing this insignificant pilot program to an 
already complex acquisition system is counterproductive.  
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Policy Alternative 2: Funnel all DoD protests regarding a single solicitation 
into one review. 
Table 4. Policy Alternative 2 









2 1 2 5 
Forcing the GAO to consider all protests regarding one solicitation at the same time 
will decrease the number of protests filed at the GAO. Unlike ASRC Communications who 
filed four protests regarding one $248 million engineering contract award, this alternative will 
allow companies to air all their grievances in one protest.  
The streamlining mechanism would improve the efficiency image of the federal 
government and potentially attract new businesses. However, this is only speculative, and 
therefore only partially satisfies the criterion of bringing new business partners to the DoD. 
Currently, each protest is processed separately at the GAO and potentially by 
different GAO officers. If the bid was for a re-compete, a vast number of protests could 
significantly delay the process and keep the bridge-contractor working on the contract. By 
funneling all protests regarding one solicitation to a single review, the government will save 
time and money while addressing the concerns of business partners. 
Policy Alternative 3: Eliminate the GAO’s role in adjudicating bid protests. 
Table 5. Policy Alternative 3 










0 0 1 1 
Transferring protest review responsibility from the GAO to the courts will not 
decrease the number of protests within the federal government. This alternative would only 
impose a later shift of the protest responsibility.  
If DoD contractors enjoy the courts protest review system more than the GAO, it 
could potentially attract new business to the DoD. However, there is no guarantee that the 
courts would perform better than the GAO. Therefore, this alternative only partially satisfies 
the second criterion. 
The court system does not have a standard method of hearing protest cases. While 
the GAO’s protest process has its flaws, there is a standard practice in place that has 
developed over nearly a century. Uncertainty in the court systems would cost the 
government more time and money in the larger scheme. 
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Conclusion 
The federal government and private companies hold different views on the problems 
surrounding protests filed at the GAO. Government officials expressed their belief that large 
corporations are filing frivolous protests to hurt competitors at a high cost to the federal 
government. Private corporations and data from RAND, the GAO, and FBO assert that there 
is no such problem of frivolous protesting. Private corporations view protests as a 
mechanism to obtain information from the federal government about why they lost the bid, 
so they can improve in the future. However, the information often comes in separated by 
multiple protests regarding the same solicitation. Converting the GAO Bid Protest Reform 
section of FY 2018 NDAA into permanent law does not satisfy the mission of the Section 
809 Panel to streamline acquisition. My analysis and scoring shows that the government 
should look into funneling all protests regarding a single solicitation into one protest review. 
Recommendation 











0 0 1 1 
Funnel 
Protests 
2 1 2 5 
Eliminate 
GAO’s role 
0 0 1 1 
The analysis from the data shows lower propensity of the GAO filed protests for low-
value solicitations. The data also showed multiple protests regarding one solicitation even 
from the same company. Therefore, the Section 809 Panel should recommend instituting 
the RAND Corporation recommendations, abandoning the pilot program established in the 
FY 2018 NDAA, and funneling all protests regarding a singular solicitation into one review. 
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